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NSA "läheb sügavale" telekommunikatsiooni infrastruktuuri

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küberjulgeoleku-300x173According to new investigations, the National Security Agency’s spying tools extend deep into the domestic US telecommunications infrastructure, giving the agency a surveillance structure with the ability to cover the majority of internet traffic in the country, according to current and former US officials and other people familiar with the system.

Although the system is focused on collecting foreign communications, it includes content of Americans’ emails and other electronic communications, as well as ‘metadata’, which involves information such as the ‘to’ or ‘from’ lines of emails, or the IP addresses people are using.

USA Interneti-infrastruktuuri võtmepunktides on NSA teinud koostööd telekommunikatsiooniteenuste pakkujatega, et paigaldada seadmed, mis kopeerivad, skaneerivad ja filtreerivad suures koguses liiklust.

See süsteem sai alguse enne 11 2001i rünnakuid ja on sellest ajast alates laienenud.

Previous reports have indicated that the NSA’s surveillance of telecommunications lines in the US focuses on international gateways and landing points. Other reports have indicated that surveillance of the U.S. telecom network was used to gather only metadata under a programme that the NSA says ended in 2011.

Ajakirjandusest nähtub, et riiklik julgeolekuasutus on koostöös telekommunikatsioonifirmadega loonud süsteemi, mis jõuab USA interneti selgroogini sügavale ja katab 75i% liiklusest riigis, sealhulgas mitte ainult metaandmeid, vaid ka sidevahendite sisu. Aruandes selgitatakse ka seda, kuidas NSA tugineb andmete tõenäosustele, algoritmidele ja filtreerimistehnikale, et läbi sõeluda andmeid ja leida teavet, mis on seotud välismaiste luureandmete uurimisega.

Mis on see järelevalvesüsteem?

reklaam

NSA on teinud koostööd telekommunikatsioonifirmadega, et töötada välja järelevalvesüsteem, mis katab ligikaudu 75% USA telekommunikatsioonist. Kohtumäärusega relvastatud NSA võib käsu anda sellele süsteemile teavet, mida ta nõuab.

The telecoms have a system in place designed to do at least initial filtering and send streams of traffic most responsive to NSA’s request to NSA machines, which then filter that stream of traffic for “selectors”—for instance, perhaps a set of IP addresses—and sift out the data that matches.

NSA can’t reach in and touch the telecommunications company’s, or anyone else’s, unfiltered corporate system. But in general it can get what it needs from the system.

Kuidas see toimib?

Kasutatav täpne tehnoloogia sõltub kaasatud telekommunikatsioonioperaatorist, seadmete paigaldamisel ja muudest teguritest.

In general, the system copies traffic flowing through the U.S. Internet system and then runs it through a series of filters. These filters are designed to sift out communications that involve at least one person outside the U.S. and that may be of foreign-intelligence value. The information that makes it through the filters goes to the NSA; the information that doesn’t meet NSA’s criteria is discarded.

Täpsemalt öeldes on süsteemis tuttavatel inimestel kaks tavalist meetodit.

In one, a fiber-optic line is split at a junction, and traffic is copied to a processing system that interacts with the NSA’s systems, sifting through information based on NSA parameters.

In another, companies program their routers to do initial filtering based on metadata from Internet “packets” and send copied data along. This data flow goes to a processing system that uses NSA parameters to narrow down the data further.

Millist teavet süsteem hoiab või loobub?

Esialgsed filtrid võivad vaadelda selliseid asju nagu saatmisviis. Näiteks YouTube'ist allalaaditud videod ei pruugi olla eriti huvitavad, et neid saaks välja filtreerida.

Filtrid vaatavad ka IP-aadresse, et kindlaks määrata edastamisega seotud geograafiline piirkond. Seda tehakse väliskommunikatsioonidele keskendumiseks.

The NSA ultimately decides what information to keep based on what it calls “strong selectors,” such as specific email addresses or ranges of Internet addresses that belong to organizations. But it receives a broader stream of Internet traffic from which it picks out data that matches selectors.

Kas see tähendab, et NSA analüütikud loevad kõiki teie e-kirju ja vaatavad teie veebis surfamist?

No. That would involve a tremendously large number of people and amount of time. However, the government is in some cases allowed to search Americans’ information that is collected through this system.

Kui palju Interneti-liiklust NSA saab?

NSA-telekommunikatsiooni seiresüsteem hõlmab umbes 75% USA kommunikatsioonist, kuid NSA poolt tegelikult salvestatud summa on väike osa sellest, praegused ja endised valitsusametnikud ütlevad.

Miks on NSA-l see süsteem olemas?

Riiklik julgeolekuasutus kasutab seda süsteemi välisriigi luureandmete uurimiseks.

Sellised uurimised hõlmavad neid, mille eesmärk on vältida rahvusvaheliste terrorirühmituste rünnakuid. Kuna nendes rühmades osalevad inimesed võivad olla USA piires, tahavad uurijad vaadata suhtlemist, mis hõlmab Ameerika inimesi, eriti neid, kes suhtlevad inimestega väljaspool USAd.

Lisaks läbivad USAsse või Interneti-teenustesse märkimisväärne hulk rahvusvahelisi liiklusvõrke ning riiklikud julgeoleku-uurijad tahavad seda teavet jälgida.

Why can’t they just focus on the international undersea cables?

The NSA began by focusing on cables that carry international traffic to and from the US under the sea. But now the agency’s reach covers a system that handles most domestic traffic as well.

Tapping only at cable landing points presents some logistical problems, says Jennifer Rexford, a computer science professor at Princeton University who studies Internet routing. First, those cables handle a huge amount of traffic at very high speeds, meaning that it is more likely for a tap there to drop or lose some of the data “packets” that make up Internet communications. Second, Internet routing is complicated: Not all parts of an Internet communication will flow over the same path, meaning it could be difficult to piece everything back together if taps are only on those lines.

Siseriiklike sidevõrkude juurdepääsuvõimalus tähendab, et süsteem on koondatud ja suudab paremini anda teavet, mida NSA vajab.

Lisaks kasutavad paljud ülemeredepartemangud USAs asuvaid Interneti-teenuseid ja NSA soovib juurdepääsu sellele liiklusele. Näiteks võib üks inimene välismaal sisse logida USA-s asuvasse e-posti teenusesse ja saata e-kirja teise isiku kontole, kes kasutab teist USA e-posti. See e-kiri reisib tegelikult USA ühest serverist teise USA serverisse, isegi kui inimesed, kes suhtlevad, olid väljaspool seda.

Kas see on seaduslik?

This system is currently conducted primarily under part of a law that was passed in 2008 amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Sometimes this part of the law is called “Section 702.”

Section 702 allows the NSA and FBI to target surveillance of people “reasonably believed” to be located outside the U.S. Rules governing how the NSA collects data under this law are approved by the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISC, but after that, each instance of surveillance doesn’t need a judge’s approval.

The NSA and FBI must outline to the court the steps they take to help ensure the communications they gather are “reasonably believed” to have a foreign element, as well as the measures used to minimize Americans’ communications that are collected inadvertently.

Selle koguga on seotud ka mõned teised õigusasutused:

Before the 2008 law was passed, the system was allowed under a short-lived stopgap law that allowed largely the same thing. Before that stopgap measure, the system was part of President George W. Bush’s warrantless surveillance program.

In addition, until the end of 2011, this same infrastructure allowed for a slightly different program that collected metadata from domestic U.S. communications in bulk. That program was possible under a part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that allowed tools called “pen registers,” which are used to collect metadata. U.S. officials say that particular program was canceled in part because it wasn’t producing valuable information.

Süsteemi mõningaid osi teostatakse ka välismaiste luureasutuste poolt. Luurekogukond on juba ammu saanud taotleda välisriikide luure järelevalve seaduse jaotise 1 alusel käskkirju. Need garantiid on suuresti sarnased õiguskaitses kasutatavatele garantiidele, välja arvatud FISC poolt nende salajase olemuse tõttu heaks kiidetud. Mõnel juhul võib nende garantiide täitmiseks kasutada Interneti-võrkude kraanid.

Millised on selle programmi piirangud?

The NSA must follow procedures approved by the secret FISA court to narrow its targets and to “minimize,” or discard, information collected about Americans. Documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden outlined the procedures as they stood in 2009.

One paragraph in these documents is particularly relevant to domestic Internet collection. In that paragraph, marked Top Secret, the government says that it will “employ an Internet Protocol filter” “or it will target Internet links that terminate in a foreign country.” This indicates that the rules allow the government either to rely on the fact that the cable runs to a foreign country or to rely on its IP filters, in order to provide reasonable assurances that the communication involves a foreigner.

The NSA also vets targets using more traditional methods, such as data it already has—and information from other agencies like human intelligence or contacts with foreign law enforcement—to decide whether they are “reasonably believed” to be outside the U.S.

Lisaks ütlevad kohtumenetlusega tuttavad inimesed, et telekommunikatsiooniteenuse pakkujate juristid saavad süsteemi kontrollida.

Pärast teabe kogumist on NSA-l eeskirjad, et minimeerida teavet inimeste kohta USAs

There are several exceptions to these minimization rules, though. The NSA is allowed to keep Americans’ information and turn it over to the FBI if it is “reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence information,” “evidence of a crime” or information about communications security vulnerabilities, the documents say. Americans’ communications also can be kept if they are encrypted, according to the documents.

Kuidas see süsteem sobib Prismiga?

The Prism program collects stored internet communications based on demands made to Internet companies such as Google Inc. under Section 702. Several companies have said the requests under this program don’t result in bulk collection, meaning they are narrower than the filtering system on the domestic Internet backbone.

Riiklik julgeolekuasutus võib kasutada neid Prism-taotlusi, et suunata interneti karkassi läbimisel krüpteeritud sidet, keskenduda salvestatud andmetele, mida filtreerimissüsteemid varem kõrvaldasid, ning saada muuhulgas lihtsamaid andmeid.

Milliseid privaatsusprobleeme see süsteem tõstab?

One involves the reliance on algorithmic filtering to sift out domestic communications. Such algorithms can be complicated, and computer IP addresses don’t always provide a good gauge of where the person is geographically.

Small changes in the algorithms can result in overcollection of Americans’ data, which can then be stored by the NSA, say former US officials, and current officials say it has stored some purely domestic communications within its systems.

Hr Snowdeni poolt avalikustatud ja hiljuti avaldatud dokumendid näitavad, et riiklik julgeolekuasutus on tehniliste vigade tõttu teinud vigu. Mõned inimesed, kes tunnevad süsteeme, ütlevad, et on mures selle pärast, et nende filtreerimissüsteemide kaudu kättesaadav suur hulk USA teavet koos filtrite keerulise olemusega tähendab seda, et kodumaise side puhul on võimalik seda hõlpsasti pühkida.

2011is leidis FISA kohus, et osa siseriiklikust NSA-telekommunikatsioonisüsteemist on põhiseadusega vastuolus, ütlevad ametnikud. Nad ütlevad, et NSA määrab 2008is programmid filtrid sobimatult ja probleem leidis NSA 2011is ja teatas sellest.

“NSA’s foreign intelligence collection activities are continually audited and overseen internally and externally,” says NSA spokeswoman Vanee Vines. “When we make a mistake in carrying out our foreign intelligence mission, we report the issue internally and to federal overseers and aggressively get to the bottom of it.”

Another possible concern is the ability of overseers, including the secret FISA court, to adequately police such technical systems. The court was created in the 1970s to oversee warrants on targets in national security investigations, not “to be in the business of approving very technical collection procedures,” said one former government official who is familiar with the legal process.

President Obama and other supporters of the programs have said the NSA programs face careful oversight from all three branches of government. “We’ve got congressional oversight and judicial oversight,” Mr. Obama has said. “And if people can’t trust not only the executive branch but also don’t trust Congress and don’t trust federal judges to make sure that we’re abiding by the Constitution, due process and rule of law, then we’re going to have some problems here.”

A person familiar with the legal process told the Journal that the system relies in part on the telecom companies themselves to push back against what they see as problematic surveillance. This person said the appropriate rules aren’t always clear, because of the complexities of Internet routing and surveillance.

USA ametnik ütles, et nende ettevõtete advokaadid on sõltumatu kontroll selle üle, mida NSA saab.

Lõpuks, erandid miinimumnõuetest tähendavad, et ameeriklaste kohta kogutud teavet saab kasutada tavapärastes kriminaaluurimistes vastavalt FISA kohtu poolt heaks kiidetud eeskirjadele. Riikliku julgeolekuasutuse ametnikud on öelnud, et nad kasutavad teavet vastavalt eeskirjadele.

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